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Cryptographic protocols are the backbone of our information society. This includes two-party
protocols which offer protection against distrustful players. Such protocols can be built from a
basic primitive called oblivious transfer. We present and experimentally demonstrate here a
quantum protocol for oblivious transfer for optical continuous-variable systems, and prove its
security in the noisy-storage model. This model allows us to establish security by sending
more quantum signals than an attacker can reliably store during the protocol. The security
proof is based on uncertainty relations which we derive for continuous-variable systems, that
differ from the ones used in quantum key distribution. We experimentally demonstrate in a
proof-of-principle experiment the proposed oblivious transfer protocol for various channel
losses by using entangled two-mode squeezed states measured with balanced homodyne
detection. Our work enables the implementation of arbitrary two-party quantum crypto-
graphic protocols with continuous-variable communication systems.
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Quantum cryptography can be used to perform crypto-graphic tasks with information theoretical security basedon quantum mechanical principles. Most prominent is
quantum key distribution (QKD), which allows to implement a
communication link that provides theoretical security against
eavesdropping1–3. Yet, there are other practically important
cryptographic protocols such as oblivious transfer (OT), bit
commitment, and secure password-based identification. In these
so-called two-party protocols, two distrustful parties (Alice and
Bob) engage and want to be ensured that the other party cannot
cheat or maliciously influence the outcome. Hence, in contrast to
QKD, security for these protocols needs not to be established
against an outside attacker but against a distrustful player.
Because of this more demanding security requirement not even
quantum physics allows us to implement these tasks securely
without additional assumptions4–10. An assumption that can be
posed on the adversary is to restrict the ability to store infor-
mation11,12. As scalable and long-lived quantum memories are
experimentally still very challenging this assumption can easily be
justified. In particular, given any constraint on the size of the
adversary’s storage device, security for two-party protocols can be
obtained by sending more signals during the course of the pro-
tocol than the storage device is able to handle. This constraint is
known as the bounded and more generally noisy-quantum-
storage model13–15.
While OT is the basic building block from which all other two-
party protocols can be derived16, it is possible to use the same
techniques to establish security of bit commitment and secure
identification. This has been achieved for protocols using a dis-
crete variable (DV) encoding into single photon degrees of free-
dom (e.g., polarization, path, or time)17,18. Using such an
encoding OT has been proposed and its security has been studied
extensively13–15,19–22. Recently, its experimental demonstration
has been reported23.
Here, we propose and experimentally demonstrate in a proof-
of-principle experiment an oblivious transfer protocol based on
optical continuous-variable (CV) systems. These systems, like
classical optical telecommunication systems, encode information
into orthogonal quadratures of the electromagnetic field. The
similarity to classical telecom systems, room temperature opera-
tion, and intrinsic noise filtering by the local oscillator of
homodyne detection will allow seamless integration into telecom
networks using wavelength division multiplexing to transmit data
and perform oblivious transfer or other quantum cryptographic
protocols on the same fiber. We prove the security of the protocol
in the noisy-quantum-storage model by establishing uncertainty
relations, different to the one used in quantum key distribution.
The experimental demonstration at a telecommunication wave-
length is based on an optical CV setup adapted from a recent
implementation of CV QKD24 which uses entangled two-mode
squeezed states and subsequent homodyne measurements in two
random orthogonal field quadratures.
Results
Oblivious transfer in the noisy-storage model. In our security
proof we derive sufficient conditions for security against a dis-
trustful party having a quantum memory with a bounded classical
capacity similar to ref. 19. The main theoretical ingredients are
entropic uncertainty relations for canonically conjugated obser-
vables which we derive with and without assumptions on the
quantum memory’s storage operation and by modeling the
quantum memory as bosonic loss channel. While we show that
security for arbitrary storage operations is possible, the trade-off
in parameters yields very pessimistic rates due to the absence of a
tight uncertainty relation. We overcome this problem by
assuming that the dishonest party’s storage operation is
Gaussian.
We consider a one-out-of-two randomized oblivious transfer
(1–2 rOT) protocol in which Bob learns one out of two random
bit strings. More precisely, Bob chooses a bit t∈ {0, 1} specifying
the bit string he wants to learn, while Alice has no input. Alice’s
output are two ‘-bit strings s0 and s1, and Bob obtains an ‘-bit
string es. A correct protocol satisfies that the outputs s0 and s1 are
independent and uniformly distributed, and that Bob learns st,
i.e., es ¼ st . To implement 1–2 OT from its randomized version,
Alice takes two input strings x0, x1 and sends Bob the (bitwise)
sums x0⊕ s0 and x1⊕ s1 mod 2. Bob can then learn xt by addinges to st⊕ xt (mod 2)19.
The protocol we propose here to implement 1–2 rOT requires
the preparation of Gaussian modulated quadrature squeezed
states of light. While indeed the protocol can be implemented
using a prepare-and-measure technique, a convenient way to
prepare such Gaussian modulated squeezed states is by homo-
dyning one mode of a quadrature entangled two-mode squeezed
state—often referred to as EPR state after the authors of their
1935 paper, Einstein, Podolski, and Rosen25. Such a state can be
generated by mixing two squeezed modes with a balanced beam
splitter26,27. In the following we will use the entanglement based
variant to implement the protocol.
Before Alice and Bob start the actual protocol, they estimate
the necessary parameters to run the protocol. The EPR source is
located in Alice’s lab who is using balanced homodyne detection
to estimate the variance of her local thermal state to fix αcut >
0 such that the probability for her to measure a quadrature with
an absolute value smaller than αcut is larger than pαcut pαcut  1ð Þ.
Alice and Bob then estimate the correlation coefficient of their
measurement outcomes, measured jointly in the same quadrature,
to choose an appropriate information reconciliation (IR) code for
the protocol. We note that this estimate can be made safely before
the protocol even if one of the parties later tries to break the
security (see ref. 23 for a discussion).
In the protocol, Alice first distributes n EPR states, each of
which is then measured by Alice and Bob who both randomly
perform balanced homodyne detection in one of two orthogonal
quadratures X and P. We assume that Alice and Bob share a
phase reference to synchronize their measurements. Alice
discretizes the outcomes of the balanced homodyne detection
by dividing the range [−αcut, αcut] into 2d bins of equal length δ
indexed by Z = {1, …, 2d}. Any measurement lower than −αcut
or larger than αcut is assigned to the corresponding adjacent bin
in [−αcut, αcut]. Here, it is important that one uses a homodyne
detector with subsequent analog-to-digital conversion with a
precision larger than δ and a range larger than ±αcut. Bob uses the
same discretization procedure after scaling his outcomes of the
balanced homodyne detection with 1=
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1 μp to account for the
losses μ in the channel. Note that here all transmitted quantum
states are used in the protocol, while in the single-photon
protocol18,23 only successful transmissions are back reported. We
denote the string of the n discretized outcomes on Alice’s and
Bob’s side as Z= (Z1, …, Zn) and Y= (Y1, …, Yn), respectively.
After completing all the measurements, Alice and Bob wait for
a fixed time Δt. As we will see later, a malicious Bob who wants to
cheat has to be able to coherently store the modes in a quantum
memory over time Δt. The rest of the protocol consists of classical
post-processing and follows the same idea as the protocol using
discrete variables14,28. First, Alice sends Bob her basis choices θiA
for each measurement i= 1, …, n, that is, whether she measured
the quadrature X θiA ¼ 0
 
or P θiA ¼ 1
 
of the ith mode.
According to his choice bit t, Bob forms the index set It
containing all measurements in which both have measured the
same quadrature and the complement I1−t of all measurements in
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which they measured different quadratures. Bob then sends the
index sets I0, I1 to Alice upon which both split their strings of
measurement results Z and Y into the sub-strings Zk and Yk
corresponding to the indices Ik (k= 0, 1). As elaborated in more
detail in the next section, the properties of the EPR source ensure
that Zt and Yt are correlated while Z1−t, Y1−t are uncorrelated.
Alice then uses a one-way information reconciliation code
previously chosen by the two parties and computes syndromes
W0, W1 for Z0, Z1 individually. She then sends W0, W1 to Bob,
who corrects his strings Yt accordingly to obtain Y′t . The
information reconciliation code must be chosen such that up to a
small failure probability ϵIR the strings Zt and Y′t coincide. Finally,
Alice draws two random hash functions f0, f1 from a two-
universal family of hash functions that map Z0, Z1 to ‘-bit strings
s0, s1, respectively. Here, ‘ is chosen appropriately to ensure the
security of the protocol, see below. Alice then sends Bob a
description of f0, f1 and Bob outputs es ¼ ft Y′t .
Correctness of the 1–2 rOT protocol. The OT protocol is correct
if Bob learns the desired string, i.e. st ¼ es and s0, s1 are uniformly
distributed. The protocol is called ϵC-correct if the output dis-
tribution of the protocol is ϵC-close in statistical distance to the
output of a perfect protocol19. Thus, ϵC is the failure probability
that the protocol is incorrect.
The correctness condition above only has to be satisfied if both
parties are honest and follow the rules of the protocol. In that case
we can assume that the source and the channel are known. The
EPR source has the characteristic property that if both parties
measure the X (P) quadrature the outcomes are (anti-)correlated.
To turn the anti-correlated outcomes of the P quadrature
measurements into correlated ones, Bob simply multiplies his
outcomes with −1. If Alice and Bob measure in orthogonal
quadratures the outcomes are completely uncorrelated. This
property of the EPR source implies that the strings Zt and Yt are
correlated while Z1−t, Y1−t are uncorrelated.
For correctness it is important to demand that the information
reconciliation code successfully corrects Bob’s string Yt with a
probability larger than 1− ϵIR. Only after successful correction,
i.e., Zt ¼ Y′t , it is ensured that es ¼ s after applying the hash
function. The properties of the two-universal hash functions also
ensure that the outcomes s0, s1 are close to uniform. By analyzing
the security for Alice we will show that Alice’s outcomes are
distributed close to uniform even if Bob is dishonest. Thus, if the
protocol is ϵA-secure for Alice (see next section) our protocol is
ϵC-correct with ϵC = ϵIR + 2ϵA19,28.
Security of the 1–2 rOT protocol. For honest Bob the oblivious
transfer protocol is secure if a malicious Alice cannot find out
which string t Bob wants to learn. The only information Bob
reveals during the entire protocol are the index sets I0, I1.
However, since honest Bob chooses his measurement basis uni-
formly at random, the strings I0, I1 are completely uncorrelated
from t. This property implies that the protocol is perfectly secure
for Bob without any assumption on the power of Alice. In par-
ticular, even if Alice possessed a perfect quantum memory she has
no chance to find out t.
For honest Alice the oblivious transfer protocol is secure if a
malicious Bob can only learn one of the strings s0, s1. Similarly to
the case of correctness we allow for a small failure probability ϵA
that security is not obtained. The precise composable secure
definition of the ϵA-security for Alice that we employ here is given
in terms of the distance to an ideal protocol that is perfectly
secure19.
The security for a honest Alice requires additional assumptions
on the power of a malicious Bob to store quantum information.
Indeed, it is clear that if a malicious Bob has a perfect quantum
memory, he could simply store all the modes until he receives the
basis-choice information from Alice. After that he can simply
measure all modes in the respective basis such that all the
outcomes between Alice and Bob are correlated. This strategy
then allows Bob to learn both strings s0, s1 and the protocol is
completely insecure. But if Bob’s quantum storage capacity to
store the modes over times longer than Δt is limited, he cannot
preserve the necessary correlation required to learn both strings.
By choosing a sufficiently small output length ‘ of the hash
function the additional correlation can be erased, and security for
Alice can be obtained. The goal of the security proof in this noisy
model is to quantify the trade-off between the capability of Bob’s
quantum memory and the length ‘ for which security can be
established.
Without restriction of generality we model Bob’s available
quantum storage ability by νn numbers of channels FΔt . Here,
the storage rate ν relates to the size of the available quantum
storage, or also the failure probability to transfer the incoming
photonic state successfully into the memory device. Additionally,
we allow Bob to apply an encoding operation E before mapping
the incoming mode to the input of his storage device. This
encoding map also includes a classical outcome K that can, for
instance, result from measuring part of the modes. A schematic of
Bob’s quantum memory model is illustrated in Fig. 1.
We apply here a similar security proof as the one in ref. 19,28
for discrete variables (see Methods section for details). Therein,
the problem of security has been related to the classical capacity
Ccl FΔtð Þ of Bob’s quantum memory channel FΔt . The other
important quantity determining the security is the probability
with which Bob can correctly guess Alice’s discretized measure-
ment outcomes Z given his classical outcomes of the encoding
map and the information of Alice’s basis choices. This probability
can conveniently be reformulated in terms of the min-entropy
Alice EPR pairs
1
Z
n K
Δt
n QoutQ in
θA
θA
Bob
Fig. 1 The general form of an attack of dishonest Bob. Alice measured her mode of distributed EPR pairs with homodyne quadratures θA, yielding
(discretized) results denoted Z. Bob’s memory attack is modeled by an encoding E that maps (conditioned on some classical outcome K) the n modes to
the memory input Qin. The memoryM is modeled by νn uses of the channel FΔt . We consider the situations where the encoding E is arbitrary, a mixture of
Gaussian channels or independent and identical over a small numbers of signals mE
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which is defined as minus the logarithm of the guessing
probability. Furthermore, since we do not require perfect security
we use the ϵ-smooth min-entropy Hϵmin ZjθAKð Þ which is defined
as the largest min-entropy optimized over ϵ-close states (see,
e.g.,29). We emphasize that it is sufficient to condition on the
classical information θA, K due to a relation of the smooth min-
entropy of all the stored information to the question of how many
classical bits can be sent reliably through the storage channel, i.e.,
Ccl FΔtð Þ19 (see Methods section for more details).
A bound on the smooth min-entropy Hϵmin ZjθAKð Þ is an
uncertainty relation. To see this link, we can consider the
equivalent scenario in which Bob sends Alice an ensemble of
states {ρk}, where k corresponds to the different instances of the
random variable K. Alice applies on each mode randomly either a
discretized X or P measurement. Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle tells us that there exists no state for which Bob can
correctly guess both outcomes for X and P. Since Bob does not
know beforehand whether Alice is measuring X or P, he will
always end up with an uncertainty about Alice’s outcomes Z. In
the Methods section we derive such uncertainty relations that
allow us to bound
1
n
Hϵmin ZjθAKð Þ  λϵðδ; nÞ ; ð1Þ
with a state-independent lower bound λϵ(δ, n). In the above
equation the most crucial difference between the continuous- and
the discrete-variable implementation appears. Indeed, while for
discrete variables an uncertainty relation for BB84 measurements
is required, we here need one for discretized position and
momentum observables with finite binning δ.
We have now all ingredients to state the final results. Let us
assume that the reliable communication rate of Bob’s quantum
memory channel decreases exponentially if a coding rate above
the classical capacity Ccl FΔtð Þ is used. Then, given that λϵ satisfies
Eq. (1), we obtain an ϵA-secure 1–2 rOT if the length of the
output bit string is chosen as
‘  n
2
λO ϵAð Þðδ; nÞ  rIR  νCcl FΔtð Þ
 
O log 1
ϵA
 
: ð2Þ
Here, rIR ¼ ð1=nÞlog W0W1j j is the rate of bits used for
information reconciliation. The explicit dependence on ϵA and
the relation between the security and the classical capacity
Ccl FΔtð Þ are given in the Methods section. If the right hand side
of Eq. (2) is negative, security for Alice is not possible.
We see that security can be achieved for sufficiently large n if
λO ϵAð Þ  rIR  νCcl FΔtð Þ is strictly larger than 0. In other words,
we need that the uncertainty generated by Alice’s measurements
should be larger than the sum of the leaked information during
information reconciliation and the storage capacity of Bob. It is
thus essential to find a tight uncertainty relation Eq. (1). We
derive such an uncertainty relation in the Methods section. It
turns out that it is difficult to derive a tight bound without further
assumptions. This is partly due to the fact that no non-trivial
uncertainty relation exists for continuous X and P measurements,
i.e., if δ goes to 0. The uncertainty relation has thus to be derived
directly for the discretized X and P measurements. We therefore
also derive uncertainty relations under different assumptions on
Bob’s encoding operation E, namely, under the assumption that
the encoding operation is a Gaussian operation and under the
assumption that the encoding operation acts independent and
identically (i.i.) on a limited number of modes mE . For the explicit
form of the uncertainty relations, we refer to the Methods section.
Security for realistic memory devices. Let us analyze the security
in the case that Bob’s quantum memory can be modeled by a
lossy bosonic channel N n, where η denotes the transmissivity.
The classical capacity of this channel has only recently been
determined after settling the minimal output entropy con-
jecture30,31. If the average photon number of each code word is
smaller than Nav, it is given by g(ηNav), where gðxÞ ¼ ðx þ
1Þgðx þ 1Þ log2ðx þ 1Þ  x log2 x. An energy constraint is neces-
sary as otherwise the capacity is unconstrained due to a memory
that is infinite dimensional.
Recall that we further require that the success probability for
reliable communication must drop exponentially to apply the
security proof. It has been shown that for this to be the case a
constraint on the average number of the photons is not sufficient
but one has to impose that every code word is with high
probability contained in a subspace with maximally Nmax
photons32. Under this maximal photon number constraint the
reliable communication vanishes exponentially at a rate above the
classical capacity g(ηNmax)32–34, so that we can apply our security
proof with Ccl FΔtð Þ= g(ηNmax).
We plot in Fig. 2 under which assumptions on Bob’s quantum
storage device security can be obtained. In particular, we consider
the situation of arbitrary encoding operations, the situation that
Bob’s encoding operation is a Gaussian operation, and the
situation that Bob’s encoding operation is independent and
identical over blocks of at most 10 modes. To obtain security, i.e.
a positive OT rate, for arbitrary encoding operations, it is
necessary to have an information reconciliation code with almost
perfect efficiency β= 1. The information reconciliation efficiency
describes the classical communication rate compared to the
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Fig. 2 Oblivious transfer security regions. The secure regions are obtained
for different assumptions imposed on the encoding operation of malicious
Bob’s quantum memories. We plot optical efficiency η of the quantum
memories versus the logarithm to basis 10 of the quantum memory storage
rate ν. Security is obtained for all values of ν and η marked by the colored
regions. The green region is obtained under the assumption that the
encoding is Gaussian (n= 2 × 105, β= 0.944, δ= 0.1), the blue region
under the assumption that the encoding is independent and identical over
at most mE = 10 modes (n= 108, β= 0.944, δ= 0.1), and the red region
without any assumption, i.e. arbitrary encodings (n= 108, β= 0.98, δ=
1.0). The plots are obtained for an EPR source with two-mode squeezing of
12 dB and losses on Alice’s and Bob’s side of 3 and 6%, respectively. Further
parameters: ϵA = 10−7, αcut= 51.2 and Bob’s maximal photon number in
the encoding is assumed to be smaller than 100
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asymptotic optimal value, where the latter is achieved for β= 1.
Current codes for CV systems can reach about β= 0.9835,36. The
weakest requirements on the parameters have to be imposed
under the Gaussian assumption in which security can already be
obtained for low numbers of signals n= 105 (see Methods
section). Under the independent and identical encoding assump-
tion, larger numbers of transmitted signals n= 108 are required
to obtain security under similar conditions as in the case of
Gaussian operations.
In general, to obtain security a transmittance of the channel
between Alice and Bob larger than 0.5 and non-trivial squeezing
is required. This result is easily obtained if one takes the
asymptotic limit for n to infinity under Gaussian or the identical
and independent encoding operations. We note that the identical
and independent assumption is no restriction of generality any
more in the asymptotic limit37.
Experimental demonstration of 1–2 rOT. We performed a
proof-of-principle experimental demonstration of the 1–2 rOT
protocol using the experimental setup employed for CV QKD in
ref. 24 and sketched in Fig. 3a. The EPR source was located at
Alice’s location and consisted of two independent squeezed-light
sources each producing continuous-wave squeezed vacuum states
at 1550 nm by parametric down-conversion27. Both states were
interfered at a balanced beam splitter with a relative phase of π/2
thereby exhibiting more than 10 dB entanglement according to
the criterion from Duan et al.38. Alice kept one of the entangled
modes and performed balanced homodyne detection using a low-
noise, high quantum efficiency homodyne detector (see details in
the Methods section). The homodyned quadrature amplitude was
chosen randomly according to random bits generated by a
quantum random-number generator based on homodyne mea-
surements on vacuum states. The other entangled mode was sent
to Bob via a free-space channel along with a bright local oscillator
beam which served as phase reference. Optical loss in this channel
was introduced by a variable beam splitter comprising a half-wave
plate and a polarizing beam splitter. Bob performed balanced
homodyne detection on his mode with a random quadrature
chosen by a similar quantum random-number generator. The
measurement repetition rate of the system was 100 kHz. For more
experimental details we refer to the Methods and the ref. 24.
The classical post-processing was implemented as described
above. We chose the number of exchanged signals to be 2.03 ×
105 such that the number of measurement results where both
parties have measured in the same bases and where both parties
have measured in different bases are both larger than 105 with
high probability. We then chose from each set the first 105 for
post-processing (i.e., n= 2 × 105) to keep the block size of the
information reconciliation code constant. From a security
perspective this is possible because the size of the set is
determined beforehand as part of the protocol. Because the
honest player chooses his/her basis string uniformly at random,
the choice of these sets is thus out of control of any dishonest
player. For the discretization of the measurement outcomes, we
used αcut= 51.2 and δ= 0.1, obtaining symbols from an alphabet
of size 1024 corresponding to 10 bits per symbol.
The most challenging part is the information reconciliation for
which we used a similar strategy as in ref. 24 and detailed in
ref. 36. Here, Alice first communicated the four least significant
bits of each symbol in plain to Bob. To correct the remaining
6 bits, she then used a non-binary low-density parity-check
(LDPC) code with field size 64 and a code rate R compatible
with the estimate of the correlation coefficient ρ from the CM.
After Bob has received the syndrome corresponding to his
input bit t (ignoring the data corresponding to bit 1− t) he ran
a belief propagation algorithm to correct Yt. In Table 1 we
summarize the used code-rates for the different loss scenarios in
our experiment.
As family of two-universal hashing functions we selected the
mapping of the binary input string to the binary output string by
multiplying the input string with a uniformly randomly chosen
binary Toeplitz matrix T. Multiplication by a Toeplitz matrix is
equivalent to linear cross-correlation. This allowed us to make use
of the number-theoretic transform to obtain an implementation
with computational complexity O(n log n) and without floating
point errors. The binary input strings had a total length of 106
bits (consisting of n/2= 105 symbols with 10 bits per symbol).
The binary output strings had a length of ‘b c. Thus the size of T
was ‘b c ´ 106. The seed (the values for the first row and first
column of the Toeplitz matrix) was generated with the quantum
random number generator.
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Fig. 3 Experimental setup and results. a Squeezed light at 1550 nm was
generated in two parametric down-conversion sources and superimposed
at a 50:50 beam splitter to obtain entanglement. One mode was kept
locally by Alice and measured with homodyne detection randomly in the
amplitude and phase quadrature. The other mode was sent through a free-
space channel simulated by a half-waveplate and a polarizing beam splitter
(PBS). Bob then performed homodyne detection randomly in amplitude and
phase quadrature. PD photodiode, LO local oscillator. b Secure oblivious
transfer rate per signal obtained in the experiment. Points correspond to the
generated oblivious transfer rates in the experiment for two different
storage rates, ν= 0.001 (red) and ν= 0.01 (blue), for quantum memories
with a transmittance of 0.75. The lines show simulated oblivious transfer
rates obtained by applying a one-sided loss channel with losses μ to the
estimated two-mode squeezed state in the experiment. Parameters: n=
2 × 105, αcut= 51.2, δ= 0.1, ϵA = 10−7, and Bob’s maximal photon number
in the encoding is assumed to be smaller than 100
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The correctness parameter ϵC = ϵIR + 2ϵA of the protocol
depends on security parameter ϵA, which we chose to be 10−7,
and the probability of successful information reconciliation. From
the given frame error rates in Table 1, we deduce a success rate of
larger than 99.9%, i.e. ϵIR = 10−3, limited by the amount of
experimental data taken, which yields ϵC = 10−3. The single
frame error for 9% channel loss is thereby due to an error which
prevents convergence of the LDPC decoder. The average overall
efficiency of the information reconciliation was 94.4%. While
generally possible, the temporal drift of the experimental setup in
combination with the requirement of achieving a low frame error
rate prevented a higher efficiency.
The results are shown in Fig. 3b. We computed the security
under the Gaussian assumption and under the assumption on
Bob’s quantum memories that the maximal photon number in
the encoding is smaller than 100. The points correspond to the
experimental implementation and the theoretical lines were
computed using the estimated CM and the efficiency of the
information reconciliation protocol used with the lossless
channel. We see that for low channel loss, rates in the order of
0.1 bit per transmitted quantum state are possible. The maximal
tolerated loss in the communication channel heavily relies on the
assumptions on malicious Bob’s storage rate, which we set to ν=
0.01 and ν= 0.001 in Fig. 3b.
Discussion
We presented and experimentally demonstrated a protocol for
oblivious transfer using optical continuous-variable systems, and
showed security against a malicious party with an highly
imperfect quantum storage device. For the implementation we
used a strongly entangled two-mode squeezed continuous-wave
light source, and balanced homodyne detection together with a
quantum random-number generator for the measurements.
While the employed EPR entangled state was close to optimal in
the investigated regime of up to 15% channel loss, security can
also be obtained with weaker entangled sources, e.g. for a quan-
tum memory storage rate of ν= 0.001 only about 4 dB of
squeezing are necessary to obtain security for 15% loss. More
details can be found in the Methods section.
The secure bit rate of the OT protocol is in trade-off with
assumptions on the quantum storage device of a dishonest party.
In particular, it depends on the classical capacity of the storage
device Ccl and the storage rate ν. The storage rate is determined by
the size of the available quantum storage and the success rate for
transferring the photonic state into the quantum memory. To
obtain security for any storage size, one can simply increase the
number of signals sent during the protocol. The classical capacity
is determined by the efficiency of the quantum memory for
writing, storing (over time Δt) and reading out. Typical storage
times of state-of-the-art quantum memories are milliseconds to
seconds with some going up to minutes39.
For low channel losses we obtain rates that are about a factor
three larger than those achievable in a previous DV imple-
mentation23 while using significantly smaller block sizes of about
105 compared to 107. However, our implementation is susceptible
to losses and requires the optical loss to be generally less than
50%. This limit is a consequence of the analysis we employ in the
security proof and is not a fundamental property of CV oblivious
transfer. For practical purposes we encounter, however, an even
lower loss threshold. For instance, in our experiment losses below
26% for ν= 0.01 and 32% for ν= 0.001 are necessary (see Fig. 3).
This allows for an implementation of the protocol in short-range
applications like a short free-space link with high collection
efficiency, e.g., at an ATM, or a short fiber link of maybe 3–4 km
within a business district of a city. Here, we assumed a free-space
to fiber coupling efficiency of 95% (achievable with anti-reflex
coated fibers), a realistic fiber transmission loss of 0.3 dB/km at
1550 nm and a high efficiency free-space homodyne receiver as
implemented in our experiment.
Information reconciliation is required to correct the discretized
(non-binary) data. In contrast to the case of DV, where condi-
tioned on the arrival of a photon the bit-error rate is rather low,
we require efficient information reconciliation for non-binary
alphabets with high probability of success, i.e. low block error
rate, since a two-way check ensuring that information reconci-
liation was successful will in contrast to QKD compromise
security.
The security proof presented here can be adapted to other two-
party cryptographic protocols such as bit commitment and secure
identification using similar ideas and protocols as in13,18,19,28.
Moreover, the security proof can be refined in various directions.
Firstly, our security is related to the classical capacity of a mal-
icious party’s quantum memory. However, conceptually, the
security of the protocol relies on the ability to store quantum
information coherently so that a reduction to the quantum
capacity or a related quantity would be desirable. This relation
has recently been shown for DV protocols using the entangle-
ment cost20 and the quantum capacity21,22,40, but its general-
ization seems challenging for CV protocols as properties of finite
groups have been used. Secondly, it is important to derive tight
uncertainty relations that hold without additional assumptions.
Having such a relation would remove the current constrained on
the encoding operation into the quantum memory and possibly
also remove the 50% loss limit. Finally, it would be interesting to
clarify if OT can be implemented securely in the noisy-storage
model using only coherent states. Although squeezing or entan-
glement is necessary in our security proof, it is not clear whether
this is due to our proof technique or whether it is a general
requirement.
Methods
Introduction to smooth min-entropy uncertainty relations. The security of OT
in the noisy-storage model relies on tight uncertainty bounds λϵ on the smooth
Table 1 Parameters for information reconciliation and privacy amplification
Loss σA ρ capacity R rIR β FER ‘ (kbit)
0 4.838 0.9960 3.486 0.94 4.36 0.942 0/985 44.4
3% 4.238 0.9936 3.151 0.92 4.48 0.943 0/1083 38.4
6% 4.535 0.9932 3.101 0.90 4.60 0.951 0/985 32.4
9% 4.556 0.9923 3.013 0.88 4.66 0.941 1/1182 26.4
12% 4.637 0.9916 2.950 0.87 4.78 0.950 0/1083 23.4
15% 4.584 0.9903 2.846 0.85 4.90 0.937 0/1358 17.4
Mean values for channel loss, standard deviation of Alice’s data σA, correlation coefficient ρ, channel capacity, code rate R of LDPC codes over GF(64) used, corresponding leakage rate rIR, efficiency β,
frame error rate (FER) and exemplified output length ‘ for ν= 0.001 and the other parameters as described in the caption of Fig. 3
ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1038/s41467-018-03729-4
6 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |  (2018) 9:1450 | DOI: 10.1038/s41467-018-03729-4 |www.nature.com/naturecommunications
min-entropy, Eq. (1)41 (for the details why this is the decisive quantity see method
section 4.5). As discussed in the main text we can think of dishonest Bob preparing
an ensemble of states ρkAn
	 

k according to K. Here, A
n indicates that Alice (A)
holds the n modes sent by Bob. A restriction on the encoding map E translates to a
restriction on the ensemble. Clearly, without any restriction on E there is no
restriction on ρkAn . If E is a Gaussian operation, then each ρkAn is a mixture of
Gaussian states, since the source distributed by Alice is Gaussian. Note that mix-
tures have to be considered since combining two or more values of K into one is a
simple operation. And finally, if E acts independently and identically over only mE
modes, then each ρkAn is identical and independent over mE modes since the source
is assumed to be identical and independent for each mode.
Uncertainty relation without assumptions. Because of the maximization in the
definition of the smooth min-entropy over close-by states, it is very difficult to
bound it directly. Instead, it is convenient to follow the idea from42 and to
use the fact that it can be related to the conditional α-Rényi entropies defined as
HαðAjBÞρ = 11α logtr ραAB idA  ρB
 1αh i
. In particular, it holds for α∈ (1, 2] and
any two finite random variables X and Y that Hϵmin(X|Y) ≥Hα(X|Y)− 1/(α− 1)log
2/ϵ243. This relation can be generalized to discrete but infinite random variables
using the approximation result from44. We then obtain a lower bound on the
smooth min-entropy with
λϵðδ; nÞ ¼ sup
1<α2
Bαðδ; nÞ  1
nðα 1Þ log
2
ϵ2
 
ð3Þ
if (1/n)Hα (Z|θ) ≥ Bα(δ, n) holds. Moreover, it suffices to find a bound for n= 1, as
Bα(δ, n)= nBα(δ, 1)42.
We denote in the following by {xl} and {pl} (l 2 N) the probability distribution
of the discretized X and P measurement. Using the definition of the α-Rényi
entropy, one finds that 2ð1αÞHαðZjθÞ = 12
P
k2N x
α
k þ
P
l2N p
α
l
 
. Since the
distributions xk and pk are discretized X and P distributions that are related by
Fourier transform, they satisfy certain constraints. For instance, it is not possible
that both have only support on a finite interval.
A precise formulation of the constraint for the probabilities x[I] and p[J] to
measure X in interval I and P in interval J has been given by Landau and Pollak45.
They proved that these probabilities are constrained by the inequality
cos1
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q½Ip þ cos1 ffiffiffiffiffiffiffip½Jp  cos1 ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiγ Ij j; Jj jð Þp . Here, Ij j denotes the length of the
interval I, and γða; bÞ := ab=ð2πhÞSð1Þ0 1; ab=ð4hÞð Þ2 with Sð1Þ0 the 0th radial prolate
spheroidal wave function of the first kind. For ab sufficiently small γ can be
approximated by γ(a,b) ≈ ab/(2πħ).
The above constraint on q[I] and p[J] can be reformulated in the following
way46: (i) if 0 ≤ q[I] ≤ γ( Ij j, Jj j), then all values for p[J] are possible, and (ii) if γ( Ij j,
Jj j) ≤ q[I], then p[J] ≤ g(q[I], Ij j, Jj j) for g(q, a, b) := ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiqγða; bÞp +ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffið1 qÞð1 γða; bÞÞp 2. This yields an infinite number of constraints for {ql} and
{pl}. Let us assume that {ql} and {pl} are decreasingly ordered, then for allM;N 2 N
it has to hold that
XN
j¼1
pj  g
XM
i¼1
qi;Mδ;Nδ
 !
: ð4Þ
It is challenging to turn the above constraints into an explicit and tight upper
bound for the α-Rényi entropy. In the following we discuss a possible way that
connects the above constraints with a majorization approach.
Let us denote by {rj} the decreasingly ordered joint sequence of both
distributions {ql} and {pl}. Then, we can write 2ð1αÞHαðXjθÞ = 12
P
j2N r
α
j . Since the
function r 7!Pj2N rαj is Schur convex, it can be upper bounded by any sequence wj
majorizing rj. Such a wj can be constructed in a way shown in ref. 47.
First, note that condition (ii) above implies that q[I]+ p[J] ≤ q[I]+ g(q[I], Ij j,
Jj j). Optimizing the right hand side over all 0 ≤ q[I] ≤ 1, we obtain the constraint q
[I]+ p[J] ≤ 1+
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
γ Ij j; Jj jð Þp . This then implies that Pnj¼1 rj  1þ FnðδÞ, where
FnðδÞ ¼ max1kn
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
γðkδ; ðn kÞδÞp . Here, the maximum is attained for k ¼ n2 .
We can now construct a majorizing sequence w by setting recursively w1= 1
and wk= Fk− wk−1 for k ≥ 2. The obtained bound on the α-Rényi-entropy is then
given by BαMaj =
1
1α log
1
2
P
k w
α
k
 
. According to Eq. (3), this translates into a bound
on the smooth min-entropy given by
λϵMaj :¼ sup
1<α2
BαMaj 
1
nðα 1Þ log
2
ϵ2
 
: ð5Þ
A plot of the bound is given in Fig. 4. We emphasize that the obtained bound seems
not very tight, especially for small δ. We believe that this problem is due to the fact
that the way how the majorizing sequence is constructed does not exploit all the
possible constraints.
Uncertainty relation under Gaussian assumption. In order to obtain an
improved uncertainty relation we assume that the states ρkAn are mixtures of
Gaussian states. Similarly as before, we derive a bound for the α-Rényi entropy with
α ∈ (1, 2] and use Eq. (3) to obtain a bound on the smooth min-entropy. This
argument implies that it is again sufficient to consider the case n= 1.
Let us first assume that the state is Gaussian such that the continuous
probability distributions x(s) and p(s) of the X and P measurements are Gaussian.
We denote the standard deviations of the X and P distribution by σX and σP,
respectively. Using Jensen’s inequality we can upper bound xαk ¼
R
Ik
xðsÞds
 α
≤
δα1
R
Ik
xðsÞαds, where Ik denotes the interval corresponding to the bin k. Taking
now the sum over all bins we arrive at
P
k x
α
k ¼ δα1
R
xðsÞαds ¼: g ~σXð Þ, where
gðxÞ ¼ 1= ffiffiffiαp ffiffiffiffiffi2πp x α1h i and ~σX ¼ σX=δ is the relative standard deviation of the
Gaussian distribution x(s).
Note that the bound g ~σXð Þ becomes very loose if ~σX is very small and can even
become larger than the trivial upper bound 1. We avoid that problem by simply
bounding
P
k q
α
k  min g ~σXð Þ; 1f g. The same applies to the P quadrature yielding
the upper bound
P
k q
α
k +
P
l p
α
l  min g ~σXð Þ; 1f g+min gð~σPÞ; 1f g. We can now
apply Kennard’s uncertainty relation for the standard deviations of X and P to
obtain ~σX~σP  h= 2δxδp
 48. Optimizing min g ~σXð Þ; 1f g+min g ~σPð Þ; 1f g over all
possible ~σX ; ~σP gives 1þ ðδ2=ðπhÞÞðα1Þ=α. Hence, we find for Gaussian states the
uncertainty relation HαðZjθÞ  BαGaussðδ; nÞ with
BαGaussðδ; nÞ :¼
n
1 α log
1
2
1þ 1
α
δxδx
πh
 ðα1Þ !
: ð6Þ
This relation then leads to a bound on the smooth min-entropy with λϵGauss(n) via
Eq. (3). The improvement over the previous bound can be seen in Fig. 4.
Let us finally show that this relation also holds for arbitrary mixtures of
Gaussian states. Let us take ρ ¼Py μyρy with probability μy and ρy a Gaussian
state for any y. We then obtain that
P
k x
α
k ¼
P
k
P
y μy
R
Ik
xyðsÞds
 α
≤P
k
P
y μy
R
Ik
xyðsÞds
 α
=
P
y μy
P
k x
y
k
 α
. Here we denote by xy the X
probability distribution of ρy, and we used the concavity of the function x 7!xα .
This argument shows that the above uncertainty relation extends to arbitrary (even
continuous) mixtures of Gaussian states.
Uncertainty relation under the identical and independent assumption. Let us
assume that a certain number of quantum states are identical and independent, i.e.
that each ρkAn has tensor product structure ρ
k
An ¼ σkAmE
 n=mE , with n=mE being an
integer. It is known that if n=mE goes to infinity, the smooth min-entropy con-
verges to the Shannon entropy49,50. More precisely, we can lower bound
1
n H
ϵ
min Z
njθnð Þ by
1
mE
H ZmE jθmEð Þ  4
ffiffiffiffiffiffi
mE
n
r
log Γ ZmEð Þð Þ2
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
log
2
ϵ2
r
; ð7Þ
where Γ ZmEð Þ ¼ 2þ 2H1=2 ZmEð Þ. This relation has also been shown for infinite-
dimensional alphabets in44. If we assume that Alice knows the covariance matrix of
her reduced state, we can bound H1=2 Z
mEð Þ, and thus, Γ ZmEð Þ. It therefore remains
to find a lower bound on the Shannon entropy H ZmE jθmEð Þ.
For simplicity let us assume that mE = 1. Because the measurement choice θ is
uniformly distributed, we find that H(Z|θ)= 1/2(H(Xδ)+H(Pδ)). Thus, we recover
the usual entropic uncertainty relation for the Shannon entropy which has been
extensively studied. In particular, it has been shown that H(Xδ)+H(Pδ) ≥ log(eπħ/
δ2)51. It is easy to see that in the case of an arbitrary mE , we similarly obtain
H ZmE jθmEð Þ ≥mE=2log eπh=δ2
 
. In conclusion, we arrive at an uncertainty
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Fig. 4 Uncertainty bounds. Uncertainty bound without assumptions (red,
solid), under the identical and independent (i.i.) assumption over mE =
10 signals (blue, dashed-dotted) and under Gaussian assumptions (green,
long-dashed) depending on the binning size δ. n= 108, ϵA = 10−7. We see
that the best bound is obtained under the Gaussian assumption. Moreover,
the bound without assumption is very loose for small δ
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relation with
λϵIIDðδ; nÞ¼
1
2
log eπh= δxδp
   4 ffiffiffiffiffiffimE
n
r
log Γ ZmEð Þð Þ2
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
log
2
ϵ2
r
: ð8Þ
Security proof against a malicious Bob with restricted memory. The security
proof for an honest Alice is similar to the one in ref. 28, which is using key
results from ref. 17,19. The main difference is that we have to include the infor-
mation reconciliation leakage, and to take into account that Bob’s quantum
memory can be infinite-dimensional and that K can be continuous. According to
the protocol, we can assume that Alice is distributing a state ρAB, A= A1,…, An, for
which
tr ρAi q αcut; αcut½ ð Þ
 
 pαcut ; ð9Þ
tr ρAi p αcut; αcut½ ð Þ
 
 pαcut ð10Þ
holds for any mode i. As in the main text Z denotes Alice’s discretized measure-
ment outcomes with the binning (−∞, −αcut+ δ], (−αcut+ δ, −αcut+ 2δ], …,
(αcut− 2δ, αcut− δ], (αcut− δ, ∞). Note, that αcut is an integer multiple of δ. We
further introduce ~Z as the string of outcomes if Alice would measure a uniform
binning of δ over the entire range R (as used in the derivation of the uncertainty
relations).
To ensure composable security for Alice, we have to show that for any
memory attack of Bob, there exists a random variable D in {0, 1} such that
conditioned on D= d, Bob does not know sd with probability larger than
1− ϵA19. Denoting by B′ all the classical and quantum information held by a
malicious Bob at the end of the protocol, this condition can be formulated by using
the trace norm
ρSDSDDB′
 τSD  ρSð1DÞDB′
 
1
 ϵA; ð11Þ
where τSD denotes the uniform distribution over SD. We use lower indices to
indicate the relevant systems, that is, the overall state of a joint system with
quantum information A, B and classical random variables X, Y is denoted by ρABXY.
Hence, if X is a random variable, ρX denotes its distribution, if A is a quantum
system, ρA denotes its quantum state, and its combination ρXA can conveniently be
described by a classical quantum state.
Recall that s0, s1 are obtained by hashing the substrings Z0, Z1. Choosing the
length ‘ of the bit strings s0, s1 sufficiently small has the effect of randomization
and destruction of correlation, i.e., establishing Eq. (11). More precisely, the
condition from Eq. (11) is satisfied if52
‘  Hϵ1min ZDjSDDB
  2log2 1ϵA  4ϵ1 ð12Þ
and we can optimize over 0 < 4ϵ1 < ϵA. The crucial difference to the discrete-
variable case is that the above relation holds even if Bob’s quantum memory is
modeled by an infinite-dimensional system.
Bob’s information B′ consist of the states of his quantum memories Q and his
classical register K (see Fig. 1), Alice’s basis choice θA, and the information
reconciliation syndrome W= (W0, W1). The next goal is to remove the
conditioning on the quantum system by relating it to the classical capacity of Bob’s
quantum memory FνnΔt . For this step we use the key result from ref. 19 which says
that Hϵ1min ZDjSDDQKθAW
 
is larger than minus the binary logarithm of
P
Fνn
Δt
succ H
ϵ2
min ZDjDKθAWð Þ  log2
1
ϵ1  ϵ2ð Þ2
$ % !
; ð13Þ
where PF
νn
Δt
succ ð‘Þ is the success probability to send ‘ bits through the channel FνnΔt .
Again, we have the freedom to optimize over all 0 < ϵ2 < ϵ1. The above result,
originally proven for finite dimensions, can easily be extended to infinite-
dimensions using the finite-dimensional approximation results from ref. 44. For the
following, we will assume that the reliable transmission of classical information
over the channel FΔt decays exponentially above the classical capacity, i.e.,
PF
n
Δt
succ ðnRÞ  2ξ RCcl FΔtð Þð Þ, usually referred to as a strong converse.
The final step is to lower bound the smooth min-entropy of ZD given DKθAW
in Eq. (13). It is convenient to use the min-entropy splitting theorem14 saying that
for given two random variables Z0, Z1, there exists a binary variable D such that the
smooth min-entropy of ZD given D is larger than half of the smooth min-entropy
of the two strings together, that is, Hϵmin ZDjDKθAWð Þ ≥ 12Hϵmin Z0Z1jKθAWð Þ  1.
This theorem defines retrospectively the random variable D. The conditioning on
the information reconciliation syndrome W can be removed by simply subtracting
the maximum information contained inW given by nrIR ¼ log2 Wj j. Before we can
apply the uncertainty relation, we have to eventually relate the entropy of Z by the
one of eZ. This is necessary since a state-independent uncertainty relation cannot be
satisfied for quadrature measurements with a finite range. But due to the condition
that αcut is chosen such that the probability to measure an event outside the
measurement range is small, we can bound53 the ϵ2-smooth entropy of Z given by
the ϵ2  ϵαcutð Þ-smooth entropy of eZ, where ϵαcut ¼ ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi2 1 pnαcut r . Note that this
step requires that ϵαcut<ϵ2<ϵA=4. Since the probability that Alice measures an
outcome with absolute value larger than αcut only depends on her reduced state, the
same holds conditioning on K and θA53.
Hence, given that the uncertainty relation from Eq. (1) holds, we find that
ϵA-security for Alice as in Eq. (11) is satisfied, if we choose
‘ ¼ n
2
ξ rOT  νCclðFÞð Þ  log 1
ϵA  4ϵ1 ; ð14Þ
where
rOT :¼ 12 λ
ϵ2ϵαcut ðnÞ  rIR  2n log
1
ϵ1  ϵ2ð Þ2
þ 1
 ! !
: ð15Þ
The length ‘ can be optimized over all ϵ1, ϵ2 ≥ 0 arbitrary such that
ϵA>4ϵ1>4ϵ2>4ϵαcut . We then obtain Eq. (2) in the main text for a Gaussian loss
channel satisfying ξ= 132.
Figure 5 shows a simulation of the oblivious transfer rate under Gaussian
assumption versus the amount of squeezing in the EPR state. For the
experimentally investigated region of channel loss the generated EPR state was
close to optimal. Only for loss very close to the maximum channel loss the optimal
squeezing value is around 10 dB.
Experimental parameters. The squeezed light sources were pumped with 140
and 170 mW, respectively. The local oscillator power for Alice’s and Bob’s
homodyne detector was 10 mW each yielding a vacuum-to-electronic-noise
clearance of about 18 dB. The 14 bit analog-to-digital converter allowed us to
measure a maximum α of about 100. The quantum efficiency of the photo diodes
was 99%, the homodyne visibility 98%. The phases of the local oscillators were
randomly switched at a rate of 100 kHz between the amplitude and phase quad-
rature using a fiber coupled waveguide phase modulator. The reconstructed cov-
ariance matrix measured without loss in the channel and after local rescaling of
Bob’s variances reads
21:93 ð0Þ 21:84 ð0Þ
ð0Þ 24:89 ð0Þ 24:80
21:84 ð0Þ 21:93 ð0Þ
ð0Þ 24:80 ð0Þ 24:89
0BBB@
1CCCA; ð16Þ
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Fig. 5 Simulation of oblivious transfer rate. Simulation of oblivious transfer
rate under Gaussian assumption versus the amount of squeezing used to
prepare the EPR state for two different storage rates ν= 0.01 and ν=
0.001. The shaded areas correspond to a channel loss between 3 and 15%
which is the experimentally investigated region. The orange traces are
calculated for a channel loss close to the maximum possible value for the
respective storage rate. The anti-squeezing of the employed squeezed state
was calculated using parameters characterizing the experimental squeezed
light sources and homodyne detectors: 98.2% escape efficiency, 79.8 mm
optical round-trip length, 8MHz sideband frequency, 91.4% total optical
efficiency. Other parameters: information reconciliation efficiency 92.5%,
n= 2 × 105 samples, ϵA = 10−7, αcut= 51.2, δ= 0.1, Nmax= 100,
transmittance of quantum memories 0.75
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where the entries in brackets were not measured, but assumed to be 0. Taking an
upper bound on the variance of Alice’s state of 25, ϵA = 10−7 and n= 2 ⋅ 105 we
obtain a minimum αcut ≈ 47.9 using the expression in the previous section.
For further experimental details we refer to ref. 24.
For the post-processing we used C++11 as programming language, compiled
with GNU GCC 6.3, and ran the binary on a single core of an Intel Xeon E7-
8870v2 CPU in a PC running Linux (Debian 8) as operating system. On average we
achieved a rate of approximately 1k oblivious bit transfers per second.
Data availability. Codes for calculating the oblivious transfer rate are available at
https://github.com/qpit/ObliviousTransfer. All other data are available from the
authors upon request.
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